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Viewpoint 
The CBO estimate of the effects of the 2011 budget deal struck last week shows negligible cuts 
relative to the baseline scenario. The battle now begins over the question of the legal debt limit, 
which is expected to be reached by 16 May. 
Spain: doing “the right thing” 
We continue to believe that Spain is a separate case from other peripheral countries. The 
government fully respected its commitments on the public finance front in 2010 and has made 
progress with the reforms. After two years of falling, GDP will resume growth on a more 
balanced path. The recapitalisation needs of the Cajas remain uncertain, but efforts this last year 
point in the right direction. Mot of the correction in the residential investment sector is now 
over; households should be able to digest the increased debt burden due to the hike in ECB 
rates. 
Spain, a tough job 
The rise in unemployment in Spain, well in excess of the European average, reflects the sharper 
cyclical correction in the economy but also the greater elasticity of employment to GDP, due to 
the marked duality of the Spanish labour market. The return to positive growth rates and the 
reforms implemented by the government in the last year should help employment recover as of 
2012. However, some of the growth in unemployment might prove structural and have negative 
repercussions on domestic demand and the public finance balances. Thus, further progress on 
the reform front is crucial. 
The week’s market movers 
Due out in the Euro area are the April confidence surveys (EU Comm., Bank of Belgium business 
confidence, PMI and INSEE). The indicators should show a slight dip in sentiment, still leaving it 
historically high and in expansionary territory. 
The data in the United States should confirm the weakness of the real estate market and less 
robust growth rates in manufacturing. The March data on existing home sales, starts and 
permits should show levels close to the bottom end of the fluctuation range seen in the last six 
months. The Philadelphia Fed survey should be down in April after two months of exceptional 
gains. 
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Viewpoint 
The CBO estimate of the effects of the 2011 budget deal struck last week shows negligible cuts 
relative to the baseline scenario. The battle now begins over the question of the legal debt limit, 
which is expected to be reached by 16 May. 
  The CBO has published an estimate of the effects on the deficit of the deal signed last week 
regarding the budget for fiscal year 2011. It could be entitled “Much ado about nothing”. In 
fact, in the CBO estimates the USD 38.5Bn of cuts trumpeted in the deal in reality become a 
spending cut of just USD 352M. If to this is added the emergency military expenditure in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, USD +8Bn, spending for the fiscal year would actually be USD 3.3Bn 
higher than the current levels. The reason why most of the cuts announced would not have 
cash effects is that firstly they apply only to six months rather than the full fiscal year and, in 
addition, they cover items that cannot be cut immediately, but only gradually. Some of the 
cuts negotiated would have effects only in the medium term. 
 The first implication of the CBO estimates is that the tightening effect of the measures on 
growth in the coming quarters would be marginal. The second is that the conservative wing 
of the Republican party is against the deal: 28 Republicans in the House voted against the 
agreement and will increase the pressure for an intransigent stance in the talks due to start 
shortly on the question of the statutory debt limit. The clash will be even more bitter than the 
one unleashed over the 2011 budget. In a letter to Congress dated 4 April, Treasury Secretary 
Geithner said that the federal debt would reach the legal limit of USD 14.29Trn by16 May. 
The projection is based on estimates of the income tax revenues that will be paid by 18 April, 
plus other estimated cash flows. The Treasury, once the legal limit is reached, may continue, 
at least temporarily, to honour the payments due via exceptional measures that were 
previously adopted during the 1995 debt crisis (see Weekly Economic Monitor, 14  January 
2011). The Treasury estimates that these measures should keep the federal government 
solvent for eight weeks at  most, i.e. through to 8 July at the latest. 
 On 5 April, P. Ryan, president of the House Budget Committee, tabled the Republicans’ 
proposal for the 2012 budget which includes a programme of draconian spending cuts over 
the next decade. In 2012, the deficit would be cut to USD 995Bn (from the current estimate 
of USD 1.4Trn). Over the decade spending would be cut by USD 6Trn, via the conversion of 
the Medicare programme into a private health insurance system with subsidies funded by the 
government; plus reform of the Medicaid programme. On the revenues front, the top rate on 
personal and business income tax would be cut to 25%. 
 On 13 April, US president Obama proposed a plan to cut the federal deficit by around USD 
4Trn over 12 years, including a mix of spending cuts and tax increases. The president’s plan 
too, like that of the Republicans, includes a tax reform that would remove numerous 
deductions and simplify taxation; however, some of the increased tax take expected would 
also come from hikes in tax rates on high incomes. Of the USD 4Trn correction envisaged, 
around USD 1Trn would come from revenues. The remaining USD 3Trn would be secured 
through spending cuts, but would not alter the programmes regarding social security (also 
unchanged in the Republican programme) and healthcare (revolutionised in the plan 
presented by Ryan). The president has urged Republicans and Democrats to start talks through 
the mediation of vice-president Biden in early May. The Obama proposal is the starting base 
for the Democrats in addressing the clash over the increase in the statutory debt limit. The 
Republicans maintain the intransigent stance announced with the deficit reduction plan: to 
resolve the differences, there must be no tax hikes. The “disappointing” estimates of the 
effects of the deal over the 2011 budget and the distance between the Republican and 
Democrat plans increase the likelihood of a prolonged battle over the debt limit.  
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Spain: doing “the right thing” 
We continue to believe that Spain is a separate case from other peripheral countries. The 
government fully respected its commitments on the public finance front in 2010 and has made 
progress with the reforms. After two years of falling, GDP will resume growth on a more 
balanced path. The recapitalisation needs of the Cajas remain uncertain, but efforts this last year 
point in the right direction. Mot of the correction in the residential investment sector is now 
over; households should be able to digest the increased debt burden due to the hike in ECB 
rates. 
The confidence of the markets in Spain’s ability to manage the rebalancing process is crucial to 
the survival of Monetary Union. We still believe the country is a separate case from other 
peripheral countries. An analysis of the critical aspects of the Spanish economy gives a 
moderately positive view. Besides, the Zapatero government has succeeded in passing unpopular 
reforms, most recently the pensions reform in January. The 2012 elections will likely result in a 
change of government as flagged by the outcome of the recent administrative and regional 
elections. It is crucial to the future of the country and Monetary Union that the reform process is 
stepped up further to ensure the sustainability of the public finance balances and ensure more 
balanced growth in the years ahead. 
In 2010 the government fully respected its commitment to reduce the deficit /GDP ratio to 9.2% 
from 11.1% the previous year, breaking an uptrend in several spending items (wages and 
salaries) which had in the past shown considerable inertia. Based on the 2011 Budget we expect 
the deficit GDP ratio to fall to 6.3%, three-tenths higher than the official estimates owing to the 
more subdued growth factored into our baseline scenario. The debt is expected to rise to 63.9% 
from 60.1% in 2010. More detailed information on the public finance dynamic will be 
forthcoming soon with the presentation and examination of the Stability Programmes by the EU 
Commission at the end of April.  
However, a is well known, the sovereign debt risk for Spain involves the solvency of the banking 
system which in turn is dependent on the correction of the bubble in the real estate market and 
adjusting budget balances in the private sector. A still protracted correction in the real estate 
sector could have repercussions on the size of the potential write downs, adding uncertainty to 
the public debt trajectory. Below we assess the outlook for the Spanish economy and the real 
estate sector in light of the recent trends and imminent tightening cycle. 
The correction in residential investments should be virtually over  
As is known, between 1997 and 2007 Spain grew on average 1.3% above the Euro area avg. 
and one point above its potential (then estimated at 3.6%). The fall in interest rates with entry 
into Monetary Union boosted domestic demand, notably in consumer spending and 
construction. The cumulative contribution of residential investments to Spanish GDP growth 
between 1997 and 2007 was 4.2%. At year-end 2007 residential investments as a share of GDP 
stood at 9.3%, over 3% above the Euro area percentage (excluding Spain). At year-end 2010 
the percentage of residential investments fell to 4.2%, below the long-term avg. calculated 
since the late 1970s (4.7%). The fall in this cycle is much more pronounced (-45%) than in the 
previous cycle (90 - 95: -13%). 
We do not rule out some undershooting going forward. In the last decade the share of 
construction investments was 7.4% vs. 4.7% in the previous 20 years; if the share returned to 
an average (5.2%) half a point higher than in 1980 - 2000 (4.7%), residential investments 
should still fall in the next three years. The fall in residential investments in this cycle has been far 
more pronounced (-45%) than in the previous cycle (90 - 95: -13%). The reason lies in the 
massive response in supply with a high of 760k new starts in 2007 vs. 300k in 1989. 
Anna Maria Grimaldi 
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The share of residential investment in GDP is back to historic 
average 
 The recent trend in housing starts and completions suggest we 
may see further decline ahead 
Dwellings % of GDP
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 00 03 06 09
AE Spa
 
 
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
71 74 77 80 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 07 10
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Completions
Starts
Dwelling in % of GDP, dx
 
Source: Eurostat and Bank of Spain  Source: Eurostat and Bank of Spain 
 
The stock of unsold homes should re-absorb going fwd  House prices fell less than elsewhere... 
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Source: Bank of Spain  Source: Bank of Spain and EcoWin 
The residential construction sector should have seen most of the correction of terms of decline 
in investments. However, the further deflating of the bubble depends on the housing supply and 
demand dynamic and the stock of unsold homes. The supply of homes can be approximated by 
the number of starts/homes completed. Housing demand can be approximated by the number 
of new home sale completions recorded by notaries. At year-end 2010, finished homes totalled 
276k, vs. 424k in 2009 and below the 2000-07 (555k). New home transactions in 2010 
averaged 50k vs. 91k in 2000–07.  The Bank of Spain estimates the stock of unsold homes as 
the cumulative difference at year-end 2003 between finished homes and new home 
transactions. The stock of unsold homes is reported to have grown sharply through to year-end 
2009 since the fall in completed starts should have been offset by the fall in demand. The stock 
should have stabilised in 2010 just below 700k.1 Over the next 18 months, given the fall in starts 
and permits it is reasonable to expect a fall in starts that should trigger the gradual absorption of 
the stock of unsold homes, especially if demand remains at the late 2010 levels. Demand could 
even accelerate slightly. The dynamic in home demand depends on the financial health of 
households and on the trend in labour income, demographics and the affordability of homes. 
The impact of demographics will be marginally expansionary since only limited population 
growth is expected. However, with the economic recovery and the return to the labour and real 
estate market of unemployed young people (currently living at home) latent demand should be 
freed up. 
                                                           
 
1 Bank of Spain notes that there is some uncertainty in this estimate of 70 / 80k units corresponding to 
houses built by the owners that are not included in the official records. 
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House prices roughly in line with the fundamentals but undershooting cannot be ruled out  
The correction in house prices has been around 7% in real terms from the 2008 high. The long-
term models indicate that the overvaluation of house prices in real terms should subside 
although a correction below the long-term values cannot be ruled out. In the previous cycle 
house prices corrected for five years following the bursting of the bubble. The Bank of Spain 
notes that house prices in this cycle have shown marked downward rigidity since owners have 
preferred to wait and rent out property before concluding a sale. Accordingly, house prices 
could correct by around 5% in the current two years. A further correction in house prices might 
be exacerbated by monetary tightening over the next 18 months. Spanish households were still 
heavily indebted at year-end 2010 (90% of GDP). The financial leverage of households fell to 
58% in 2010 from a high of 60% in early 2009. Some households, given the high level of debt, 
might be forced to liquidate real estate assets, which would impact significantly on prices. Such 
a risk might become more acute as ECB interest rates rise. Mortgages in Spain are linked to 
short-term rates with a lag of 12 – 18 months. 
... seem back to “equilibrium levels  But there is room for some undershooting 
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 Source: Bank of Spain, INE and Intesa Sanpaolo calculations 
Households should be able to digest the rate hike 
To assess this risk we take the dynamic in household spending netted of the debt expense. The 
saving rate netted of the debt servicing cost was marginally above zero at year-end 2007. At 
start 2010 saving rose to 7% but in 2H10 it fell back to c.4%. Barring rates at 5% by year-end 
2012, a very aggressive and implausible scenario at this time, households should have a 
sufficient buffer to ride out negative developments on the growth front. Note that this approach 
does not take account of the differences by income class and type of consumer. The survey of 
Spanish household finances (see Bank of Spain January 2011 bulletin) includes details on the 
trend in the cost of debt for different groups of households. The Bank of Spain notes increased 
dispersion in the cost of debt. With steeper increases for consumers under 35. This group is the 
most indebted: around 68.6% of the total had contracted debt and the level of indebtedness at 
year-end 2009 was 450% of disposable income vs. 280% of the sample average income. In this 
group of consumers an increase is noted in the percentage of debt not honoured. 
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Despite high leverage households should be able to weather 
the upcoming hiking cycle 
 Only with a spike in rates to 5% households savings net od 
debt servicing costs would go back to zero 
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Improved prospects for doubtful loans  
In principle, the fact that most of the correction in the real estate bubble is now over should 
limit negative developments on the credit front and the growth in watchlist loans and NPL. The 
trend in watchlist loans is related to house prices. Another factor containing watchlist loans 
should come from the gradual improvement in labour market conditions.  
Nonetheless, there is still some uncertainty over the solidity of the Spanish savings banks and 
particularly the recapitalisation needs of the Cajas. However, major progress has been made on 
the regulatory front. 
The correction of housing excess and...   ... improvements in labour market conditions should limit the 
rise in doubtful loans 
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The reform of saving banks is an important step 
The decree – law of July 2010 aimed at reforming legal and regulatory regime for saving banks2.  
Over the past year, in line with targets set with the reform, and with the aid of FROB funds the 
number of Cajas came down to 15 from 45. The consolidation process has affected more than 
95% of the total assets of the sector. Savings banks have recognised additional losses on their 
loans and receivables and foreclosed assets for more than 20 billion euro. 
                                                           
 
2 The main objectives of the reform were: 1) allowing saving banks to have equity like instruments; 2) 
increasing the concentration of the sector- by giving the saving banks the option to (a) maintain their 
existing structure, (b) operate through a bank, (c) become part of a formal group of saving banks or (d) 
become a foundation; 3) reform corporate governance structure (prohibiting elected officials to be members 
of governing bodies. 
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The Bank of Spain Governor in a speech of April 5th highlighted that the exposure of savings 
bank to the construction and real-estate development sector amounted to 217 billion euro, of 
which 28 billion (13%) is made up of doubtful assets. Yet, the Bank of Spain forces banks to 
make for, assets acquired in payment of debt, as well as standard loans under surveillance 
owing to some observed weakness, even if payments are up to date. At the end of 2010, Cajas 
recognised as potential at risk. 100 bln euro of loans to the construction sector (46% of asset). 
Accumulated specific loan loss provisions represent 31% of these “extended” troubled assets, 
and if we add the general provisions this percentage reaches 38%. The Bank of Spain deems as 
adequate these provisions as noted by Ordonez “taking into account the margin provided by the 
loan-to-value ratio and the fall in real estate prices that has already taken place, it would be 
necessary to make catastrophic assumptions, beyond all reasonable expectations, regarding the 
expected losses in order for the total losses to be well above the total volume of loan loss 
coverage”. 
 In addition the system of provisioning has been tightened with the reform so that the banks 
have even greater incentives to speed up the restructuring of balance sheets. Indeed, doubtful 
loans have to be fully provisioned within one year once the collateral has been taken into 
account. In addition the law require provisions of 30% for foreclosed assets that remain on 
balance sheets for two years.  
Overall write downs of the Spanish banking system since 2008 amount to 96 bln euro (5 of 
GDP). Over the same period, banks have increase capital in excess of minimum requirements by 
53 bln euro, partly with  the aid of the FROB. 
Further steps to consolidate the Spanish banking system were made with the Royal Decree Law 
of February 2011.  The decree-law increases the capital requirements of Spanish banks, 
also promotes the raising of private capital and sets the timetable for recapitalisation 
of the banks that fail to reach the levels of capital targets. The FROB is set to 
participate in the process of raising private capital. 
Core capital requirements have been raised to 8% for all credit institutions and to 10% for 
those institutions  with a proportion of  funding in whole sale markets exceeding 20% and / or 
with less than 20% of their share capital held by third parties. 
The decree-law sets September 2011 as a deadline to raise capital through markets, even 
though banks planning to use IPOs might get an extension until 2012.Q1. If the capital raised 
through markets is not enough the FROB will intervene to close the gap with the initial target. 
The decree-law establishes 5 steps for banks planning to use FROB resources: 
1) The FROB will only acquire ordinary share 
2) If the banks were not in the position to issue share they would need to change their status to 
commercial bank 
3) The FROB will operate as a special director on the governing body of the bank issuing  shares  
4) The saving banks presented recapitalization plans that have been examined by the Bank of 
Spain. Thirteen institutions out of 114 examined needed have to raise capital by 15 bln euro.  
5) The FROB will sell acquired shares no later than 5 years 
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Towards more balanced growth  
Bearing in mind that the correction in the real estate bubble should be nearly over and that the 
reform of the Cajas should have improved the position of the banking system, some of the risks 
to Spain’s solvency appear to be dissipating. Assuming an orderly emergence from the real 
estate bubble without further repercussions on banking system losses, Spain’s credibility still 
depends on reducing the domestic imbalances via further progress with the reforms. The 
external imbalances have partly been reduced as shown by the fall in current account deficit, 
moreover less marked than in Ireland. Consequently, the external net financial position 
worsened further in 2010. The reduced indebtedness of the private sector stems from bank 
deleveraging while household and business debt has remained roughly at the 2009 levels. Public 
sector liabilities have also increased further. 
GDP growth is set on a more balanced path emerging from this crisis and we expect a smaller 
contribution from consumption and a more positive trend in foreign trade and business 
investments. However, for this trend to be confirmed competitiveness must be recouped. To 
date, the more favourable trend in the unit labour cost might be due simply to a cyclical upturn 
in productivity. Further progress on the wage bargaining reform front is crucial, as is the re-
absorption of workers dismissed in this crisis,  notably in construction. Indications on this front 
will come at the end of April (see in this issue of WEM: Spain: a tough job). 
With regard to the sustainability of public spending in the medium term the recent pensions 
reform marks an important step. The measures taken in the coming years must ensure that 
current expenditure continues to fall. 
Still running a current account deficit  Yet, the economy should move to a more balanced growth 
path 
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Spain, a tough job 
The rise in unemployment in Spain, well in excess of the European average, reflects the sharper 
cyclical correction in the economy but also the greater elasticity of employment to GDP, due to 
the marked duality of the Spanish labour market. The return to positive growth rates and the 
reforms implemented by the government in the last year should help employment recover as of 
2012. However, some of the growth in unemployment might prove structural and have negative 
repercussions on domestic demand and the public finance balances. Thus, further progress on 
the reform front is crucial. 
The crisis in Spain has had for more pronounced repercussions than in the rest of the Euro area, 
not just in terms of output but on employment too. The adjustment in labour input was made 
entirely through redundancies rather than reductions in hours worked, generating an increase in 
unemployment well in excess of the European average. In February, the ILO unemployment rate 
hit 20.5% in Spain, the highest in the Euro area, the maximum in 28 years. Between summer 
2007 and first quarter 2010 almost 2M jobs were lost (1,963,800), leaving the jobless total at 
4.72M. 
The rise in unemployment, far more pronounced than in the rest of the Euro area, reflects the 
“dual” structure of the Spanish labour market. The percentage of workers on fixed-term 
contracts at the end of 2010 (24.9%) was still 10 points above the Euro area average (15.8%), 
even though the percentage had been falling since late 2006. Note that total payrolls in Spain 
continued to increase through to the start of 2008. 
The large percentage of fixed-term workers accounts for the 
explosion in the jobless total in this cycle 
 The economic indicators signal a less dramatic fall in payrolls in 
the coming months  
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Source: OECD data and estimates, Intesa Sanpaolo calculations  Source: Eurostat, Markit Economics; Intesa Sanpaolo calculations 
The downtrend in the percentage of fixed-term contracts within total employment started to 
slow in 2010. In absolute terms the number of fixed-term contracts is back at the levels of the 
late 1990s, from the high of 34.6% recorded at the end of 2006.  
The outlook for the labour market remains uncertain but the economic indicators appear to 
suggest that the decline in employment should moderate this year. Hiring might pick up again in 
2012. A marked fall in unemployment will only be seen in mid-2012. 
Alessandra Gaia 
A dual labour market 
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The percentage of workers on fixed-term contracts in Spain has 
fallen sharply in recent years... 
 ... but it is still much higher than other Eurozone countries and 
the Euro area as a whole 
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Source: Eurostat; Intesa Sanpaolo calculations  Source: Eurostat; Intesa Sanpaolo calculations 
The strong expulsion of temporary workers may have more negative consequences in terms of 
composition of employment and productivity dynamics. In fact, it is possible that workers with 
contract types that allow a less onerous dismissal are excluded from employment rather than 
less efficient workers. If so, employment would be composed, leading to negative consequences 
on productivity of medium-long period.  
Cyclical or structural unemployment  
The Spanish labour market shows extremely high elasticity of employment to GDP. As 
mentioned above, in the event of negative shocks firms tend increasingly to dismiss workers 
than reduce the hours worked. The chart shows that the elasticity of employment to GDP during 
the 2008-10 crisis was more pronounced than the historical value. in the period 3Q08-4Q09, 
the elasticity of employment to GDP rose sharply vs. 1Q03-2Q08. In addition, consumption 
growth and employment growth have a close correlation of close to 90% in Spain, and 
consequently changes in the labour market provide an important key to understanding 
household consumption, which accounts for almost 75% of GDP
3
.  
Structural unemployment rate rising  Marked elasticity of employment to GDP 
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Source: OECD, Intesa Sanpaolo calculations  Source: Eurostat, Oxford Economics, Intesa Sanpaolo calculations 
The risk is that the recent rise in the unemployment rate may translate into an increase in 
NAIRU. A priori it is hard to say whether the recent rise in unemployment will translate into a 
                                                           
 
3 Economics and Interest rate strategy, Spain: On the Mend, Morgan Stanley, March 7 2011 
Labour market very sensitive to 
economic performance  
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rise in long-term unemployment, which would impact negatively on the growth outlook and the 
public finance balances. According to OECD data, structural unemployment started growing in 
2008, reaching 12.6% in 2010, close to the level of a decade ago. However, the structural 
unemployment rate is not back at the early 1990s levels; and, in the OECD projections, this rate 
is expected to grow further in 2011, albeit at a less rapid pace than in recent years. 
Undoubtedly unemployment might also prove higher owing to the scaling back of the 
construction sector. The year-on-year change in the number of jobless who before dismissal 
worked in the construction sector jumped from 5.7% yoy in 2007 to 71.1% yoy in 2008, and 
continued to grow very robustly in 2009 (62.5%). The haemorrhaging of jobs in the 
construction sector eased off in 2010 (returning to 5.7% yoy). In 4Q10 sector payrolls were back 
at the late 1990s levels: the scaling back of the sector is even more apparent when we consider 
that in 4Q10 construction sector workers accounted for just 8.5% of total payrolls (as in the late 
1980s). Most of the decline in employment appears to be over and another significant 
correction looks unlikely at this stage. 
Construction sector payrolls are back at late 1990s levels and 
the weight of the sector within total employment is much 
reduced… 
 ... following the sharp contraction stemming from the bursting 
of the real estate bubble  
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Source: National Statistics Institute, (ENS), Intesa Sanpaolo calculations  Source: National Statistics Institute, (ENS), Intesa Sanpaolo calculations 
The government has already taken major steps to counter the duality of the labour market via 
the reform package passed last September (See text box). 
The chief measures in the September 2010 Reform include increased working day flexibility for 
firms and fewer restrictions on job-shedding at times of economic crisis. The main such 
measures adopted include: 
a) Reduction in working hours: working hours may be reduced from 10% to 70% for economic, 
technical, organisational or production reasons. 
b) “Penalisation of temporary contracts”: Contracts become permanent after three years for 
workers who are hired more than once by the same company or group of companies for the 
same or a different job. The aim is to prevent employers hiring staff on a succession of 
temporary contracts designed to avoid permanent contracts. 
c) Extension of application of allowance of 33 days’ pay for each year worked in the event of 
unfair dismissal. This is a lighter pay-out than the 45 days envisaged for workers on standard 
open-ended contracts. 
d) Creation of a public fund to cover dismissal compensation. 
 Weekly Economic Monitor 
15 April 2011 
 
Intesa Sanpaolo – Research Department  12 
 
e) Simplification of dismissal procedure for companies with current or forecast losses or a steady 
decline in turnover. 
f) Possibility of dismissal for absenteeism: should the average absenteeism top 2.5% the firm 
may dismiss those workers absent from their job for over 20% of working days in two 
consecutive months or 25% in four non-consecutive months, considering a time period of 12 
months. 
Spain has one of the highest levels of severance pay in the Euro area and its interpretation of fair 
dismissal is more rigid. Severance pay is 20 days’ salary per year of service in the case of fair 
dismissal and ranges from 33 to 45 days for unfair dismissal (to a maximum of 24 and 42 
months respectively). These levels are well above the Euro area avg. Conversely, compensation is 
just 8 days per year worked in the event of fixed-term contracts1.   
Compensation in case of fair or unfair dismissal (in months’ pay) 
Country Fair dismissal Unfair dismissal 
 9 months 
employment 
4 years  
employment 
20 years  
employment 
20 years  
employment 
Austria 0 0 0 6 
Belgium 0 0 0 14 
Denmark 0 0 0 1.5 
Finland 0 0 0 14 
France 0 0.8 6.7 16 
Germany 0.2 1 5 18 
Greece 0.3 1 6 6 
Ireland 0 0.4 1.9 24 
Italy 0 0 0 15 
Luxembourg 0 0 6 5 
Netherlands 0 3 9 7 
Portugal 3 4 20 15 
Spain 0.5 0.7 12 22 
Sweden 0 0 0 32 
United Kingdom 0 0.5 2.3 8 
EU 0.3 0.9 4.7 14.1  
Source: IMF based on OECD data 
The rigidity of the Spanish labour market calls for the completion of the reform of the wage 
bargaining system negotiation take place at the intermediate level4 and provide forms of linking 
to inflation for over 69% of contracts vs. an average of 34% in the Euro area. Wage indexation 
continues to impact in relative terms on the Spanish labour cost dynamic, skewing 
competitiveness. In a note dated 13 April, Valeriano Gòmez, labour and immigration minister, 
voiced the need for pay moderation and stressing the importance of adjusting company margins 
to recover competitiveness.  
Spain: pay indexing level (percentage of workers affected) 
 Spain Euro area France Italy Belgium
Automatic link to past inflation 38 16 8 1 9
Automatic link to expected inflation 16 4 2 0.5 0
Indirect relation with past inflation 10 9 21 3 0
Indirect relation with expected inflation 5 5 8 2 0
No link with inflation 29 64 59 94 2 
Source: IMF based on Bank of Spain data 
                                                           
 
4 This system is indicated in the literature as less favourable to employment compared with fully 
decentralised or completely centralised systems. In addition, wage bargaining is tightly anchored to inflation. 
(See Calmfors and Driffill, 1988 in “The Spanish Labour Market in a Cross Country Perspective, Jaumotte F., 
IMF Working Paper”). 
Important steps have been 
taken to reduce the duality 
of the labour market 
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Despite the urgent need to decouple pay from inflation, on 7 April 2011 pay rises of 3.06% 
were agreed for 1,462 contracts affecting 327,270 firms and over 2.78M workers, with 
economic effects on 20115. 
Although these increase are worrying given the situation in Spain, progress on this front should 
come at the end of April with the conclusion of talks between unions, employers and 
government. 
Awaiting for more reforms in "education and training" 
To counter the rise in unemployment and revive the labour market, schemes to retrain 
redundant workers are vital. On this front too important signals are being seen. The Secretary of 
State for Employment, Mari Luz Rodriguez, said on 8 April that EUR 2.600M would be spent on 
job training courses. The labour market reform has also launched measures to incentivise 
ongoing training and education. First, the duration of the training and apprenticeship contract 
has been extended, as have the age limits for eligibility; second, workers on this type of contract 
are entitled to apply for unemployment benefits; third, firms may apply for a 100% reduction in 
social security contributions in respect of training contracts. However, further steps are 
necessary. According to an OECD6 report, the Spanish Government should make less 
complicated the institutional setting of continuous training and improve the access of small 
business to subsidised continuous training. In addition, companies should have more 
opportunity to choose the type of training to ensure that the training meets the firms’ needs, 
hence rendering the subsidy more effective. Finally, the government could also consider offering 
scholarships to cover tuition fees for training courses or indirect costs in terms of foregone 
income. This will facilitate learning by encouraging competition between educational institutions 
and offering a wider range of training opportunities. 
Conclusions 
In summary, the Spanish government has made major steps towards a commitment to the 
reform front, but the road ahead is still long. In the next months, the government would 
proceed to review wage bargaining system. At the same time, the announcement of new 
investment in education and continuous training should help to reduce the rise in structural 
unemployment. 
                                                           
 
5 A note from the Spanish government states that for now it has only been possible to record the deals 
relating to pay rises at a fixed rate agreed in advance: consequently, most contracts agreed through to 
March have a wage increase relating to past inflation, which in December 2010 was 3% yoy, while not 
included yet are the deals based on expected inflation, the weight of which in collective pay bargaining is 
quantitatively significant. Thus, according to the Spanish government, the figures in the first few months of 
the year are overstating the average pay increase and the agreements stipulated in the coming months will 
trigger a reduction in the average pay increase in 2011. 
6 OECD, Survey of Spain, Feb 2011. 
 Weekly Economic Monitor 
15 April 2011 
 
Intesa Sanpaolo – Research Department  14 
 
The week’s market movers 
Due out in the Euro area are the April confidence surveys (EU Comm., Bank of Belgium business 
confidence, PMI and INSEE). The indicators should show a slight dip in sentiment, still leaving it 
historically high and in expansionary territory. 
The data in the United States should confirm the weakness of the real estate market and less 
robust growth rates in manufacturing. The March data on existing home sales, starts and 
permits should show levels close to the bottom end of the fluctuation range seen in the last six 
months. The Philadelphia Fed survey should be down in April after two months of exceptional 
gains. 
 
Monday 18 April 
Euro area 
 The EU Commission index of consumer confidence might ease to -11 in April, remaining 
slightly above the long-term mean calculated since 1985 (-12). According to the GfK survey, 
household confidence slipped in Germany, while in the peripheral countries the adoption of 
new tightening measures might further dent consumer sentiment. 
United States 
 The NAHB index should be steady at 17 in April, as in March (when the first improvement 
came after four months at 16). In last month’s survey, current sales were steady (at 17), and 
future sales rose to 27 from 25. 
Tuesday 19 April 
Euro area 
 The composite PMI for the Euro area might ease to 57.3 in April from 57.6 in March. The dip 
in sentiment should be due to a slightly gloomier view both in manufacturing (on fears of a 
slowdown in global demand and a stronger euro) – we estimate 57.1 vs. 57.5 – and in 
services (57 vs. 57.2). The composite index would still be comfortably expansionary, and in 
fact would point to a marked acceleration in GDP (in the area 1% qoq). 
United States 
 New starts should rise to 515k in March from 479k in February, returning them to the levels 
seen for most of the second half of 2010. Starts were extremely volatile in the first two 
months of the year due to the weather. In February, sites fell by 22.5% mom to 479k, just 
above the all-time series low (477k in April 2009). Building permits are expected to rise to 
540k in March from 534k in February, still close to the bottom end (544k) of the range seen 
since September 2010. 
Wednesday 20 April 
United States 
 Sales of existing homes are expected to grow to 5.1M units ann. in March from 4.88M in 
February. February witnessed a plunge in sales of -9.8% mom, partly due to the weather. The 
sector remains weak: pending home sales were down in December and January and 
expectations of an increase in actual sales are based on the modest jump in pending home 
sales in February. Home prices are falling again year-on-year in both average and median 
terms; the negative trend should not change in the coming months. 
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Thursday 21 April 
Euro area 
 Germany. The IFO index might slip slightly for the second straight month in April, easing to 
110.7 from 111.1 in March. The level is still close to the series’ 20-year highs. This month too 
should show a dip in expectations (to 105.4 from 106.5) and a further improvement in the 
view of the present situation (116.1 vs. 115.8). The level of the IFO index remains consistent 
with an year-on-year acceleration in German GDP of around 5%. 
 The Bank of Belgium business confidence index might be little changed in April, at 6.1 vs. 6.2 
in March. The index, seen as a leading indicator of the industrial cycle in Germany (the largest 
outlet market for Belgian manufacturers), is not far off the series’ over-30-year highs. 
United States 
 The April Philadelphia Fed index should correct from the high recorded in March (43.4, 
highest since January 1984). The forecast is for the index to fall to 37.5, still close to the 2004 
highs like the ISM. The April survey should show a correction in new orders from 40.3 in April 
(highest since November 1983), along with further rises in prices paid from 63.8 in March. 
Expectations six months forward should also fall from 63 in March. The signals from 
manufacturing in this quarter should point to growth stabilising/slowing owing to the 
transitory effects of the earthquake in Japan. 
Friday 22 April 
Euro area 
 France. Manufacturing business confidence might be unchanged at 109 in April, well above 
its long-term average (100). The new orders component could retrace after last month’s jump 
(to -5 from -17). The levels of the production and selling price sub-indices should remain high. 
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Calendar of macroeconomic data and events 
Calendar of macroeconomic data (18-22 April) 
Date   Time Country Data release * Period Previous  Consensus Intesa Sanpaolo 
Mon 4/18  16:00 EUR Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence (flash) * APR -10.6  -11.0 -11.0 
   16:00 USA NAHB Housing Market Index  APR 17  17 17 
Tue 4/19  07:00 JAP Consumer Confidence Households  MAR 40.6    
   09:00 FRA PMI Manufacturing (prelim.) * APR 55.4  55.4  
   09:00 FRA PMI Services (prelim.) * APR 60.4  60.0  
   09:30 GER PMI Manufacturing (flash)  APR 60.9  60.1  
   09:30 GER PMI Services (flash)  APR 60.1  59.8  
   10:00 EUR PMI Composite (flash) ** APR 57.6  57.1 57.3 
   10:00 EUR PMI Manufacturing (flash) ** APR 57.5  57.0 57.1 
   10:00 EUR PMI Services (flash) ** APR 57.2  56.9 57.0 
   14:30 USA Building Permits  MAR (517)  534 k 540 540 
   14:30 USA Housing Starts * MAR 479 k 525 515 
Wed 4/20  01:50 JAP Adjusted Merchnds Trade Bal.  MAR 556 bln 327.5  
   01:50 JAP Tertiary Industry Index (MoM)  FEB 2.1 % 0.1  
   08:00 GER PPI (YoY)  MAR 6.4 % 6.6  
   08:00 GER PPI (MoM)  MAR 0.7 % 0.8  
   10:00 ITA Industrial Sales n.s.a. (YoY)  FEB 8.0 %   
   10:00 ITA Industrial Sales s.a. (MoM)  FEB 1.0 %   
   10:00 ITA Industrial Orders n.s.a. (YoY)  FEB 17.5 %   
   10:00 ITA Industrial Orders s.a. (MoM)  FEB -0.3 %   
   16:00 USA Existing Home Sales  MAR 4.88 mln 5.0 5.1 
Thu 4/21  07:00 JAP Leading Index CI (final)  FEB 104.2    
   10:00 GER IFO - Business Climate ** APR 111.1  110.6 110.7 
   10:00 GER IFO - Expectations  APR 106.5  105.9 105.4 
   10:00 GER IFO - Current Assessment  APR 115.8  115.5 116.1 
   10:30 GB  Retail Sales (YoY)  MAR 1.3 % 1.1  
   10:30 GB  Retail Sales (MoM)  MAR -0.8 % -0.5  
   14:30 USA Initial Jobless Claims  week 412 k   
   15:00 BEL Business Confidence Level. Sa * APR 6.2  5.6  
   16:00 USA Leading Indicators  MAR 0.8 % 0.3  
   16:00 USA House Price Index MoM  FEB -0.3 %   
   16:00 USA Philadelphia Fed. * APR 43.4  37.0 37.5 
Fri 4/22  08:45 FRA Business Confidence Indicator * APR 109  109 109 
   10:00 ITA Retail Sales (YoY)    FEB -1.2 %    
(?) First likely date; (**) very important; (*) important; in column “Previous” in parenthesis data before the revision  
Source: Intesa Sanpaolo Research Department  
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Calendar of macroeconomic data (25–29 April) 
Date   Time Country Data release * Period Previous  Consensus Intesa Sanpaolo 
Mon 4/25  16:00 USA New Home Sales * MAR 250 k   
Tue 4/26  15:00 USA S&P/CS Composite-20 YoY  FEB -3.1 %   
   16:00 USA Consumer Confidence * APR 63.4    
Wed 4/27  01:50 JAP Retail Trade YoY  MAR 0.1 %   
   03:00 JAP Small Business Confidence  APR 49.5    
   10:00 ITA Consumer Confidence Ind. sa  APR 105.2    
   10:30 GB  GDP (QoQ) (flash) ** Q1 -0.5 %   
   11:00 EUR Industrial New Orders YoY  FEB (20.9)  22.1 %   
   11:00 EUR Industrial New Orders SA MoM  FEB (0.1)  1.1 %   
   14:30 USA Durable Goods Orders * MAR (-0.9)  -0.6 % 1.0  
   14:30 USA Durables Ex Transportation  MAR (-0.6)  -0.3 %   
   NA GER Consumer Price Index (YoY) (prelim.) * APR (2.1)  2.1 %   
   NA GER Consumer Price Index (MoM) (prelim.) * APR (0.5)  0.5 %   
   NA GER CPI - EU Harmonised (YoY) (prelim.) ** APR (2.3)  2.2 %   
   NA GER CPI - EU Harmonised (MoM) (prelim.) ** APR (0.6)  0.5 %   
Thu 4/28  01:30 JAP Household Spending (YoY) * MAR -0.2 %   
   01:30 JAP Natl CPI YoY ** MAR 0.0 %   
   01:30 JAP Natl CPI Ex-Fresh Food YoY ** MAR -0.3 %   
   01:30 JAP Job-To-Applicant Ratio  MAR 0.62    
   01:30 JAP Jobless Rate  MAR 4.6 %   
   01:50 JAP Industrial Production (MoM) (prelim.) * MAR 1.8 %   
   08:45 FRA Consumer Spending (MoM) * MAR 0.9 %   
   09:55 GER Unemployment Rate (s.a)  APR 7.1 %   
   09:55 GER Unemployment Change (000's) ** APR -55 k   
   10:00 ITA Business Confidence * APR 103.8    
   14:30 USA Core PCE QoQ (advance) ** Q1 0.4 %   
   14:30 USA GDP QoQ (Annualized) (advance) ** Q1 3.1 % 2.1  
   14:30 USA GDP Price Index (advance) ** Q1 0.4 %   
   14:30 USA Initial Jobless Claims  week -    
Fri 4/29  09:00 SPA CPI (EU Harmonised) (YoY) (prelim.) * APR 3.3 %   
   10:00 EUR Euro-Zone M3 s.a. (YoY) * MAR 2.0 %   
   10:00 ITA Monthly Unemployment Rate SA (prelim.) * MAR 8.4 %   
   11:00 EUR Euro-Zone CPI Estimate (YoY) ** APR 2.6 %   
   11:00 EUR Euro-Zone Consumer Confidence (final)  APR -    
   11:00 EUR Euro-Zone Indust. Confidence  APR 6.6    
   11:00 EUR Euro-Zone Services Confidence  APR 10.8    
   11:00 EUR Euro-Zone Economic Confidence ** APR 107.3    
   11:00 EUR Euro-Zone Unemployment Rate * MAR 9.9 %   
   11:00 ITA CPI - EU Harmonized (YoY) (prelim.) * APR -    
   11:00 ITA CPI - EU Harmonized (MoM) (prelim.) * APR -    
   11:00 ITA CPI (NIC incl. tobacco) (YoY) (prelim.) * APR -    
   11:00 ITA CPI (NIC incl. tobacco) (MoM) (prelim.) * APR -    
   12:00 ITA PPI (YoY)  MAR 5.7 %   
   12:00 ITA PPI (MoM)  MAR 0.6 %   
   14:30 USA Employment Cost Index * Q1 0.4 %   
   14:30 USA PCE Core (YoY) * MAR 0.9 %   
   14:30 USA PCE Core (MoM) * MAR 0.2 %   
   14:30 USA PCE Deflator (YoY) * MAR 1.6 %   
   14:30 USA Personal Income  MAR 0.3 %   
   14:30 USA Personal Spending * MAR 0.7 %   
   15:45 USA Chicago Purchasing Manager * APR 70.6    
   15:55 USA U. of Michigan Confidence (final)    APR -     
(?) First likely date; (**) very important; (*) important; in column “Previous” in parenthesis data before the revision.  
Source: Intesa Sanpaolo Research Department  
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Calendar of events (18 -22 April) 
Date  Time Country * Event 
Mon 4/18 16:30 USA   Fed's Fisher, Lockhart to Discuss Globalization in Atlanta 
  18:00 USA   Fed's Bullard to Speak on Banking Rules in Kentucky 
  18:30 USA   Fed's Fisher to Speak on US Economic Outlook in Atlanta 
Wed 4/20 10:30 GB * Bank of England Releases Monetary Policy Committee Minutes 
Thu 4/21 03:30 JAP   BoJ Deputy Governor Nishimura to Speak in Yokohama City      
(**) very important; (*) important.   
Source: Intesa Sanpaolo Research Department  
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United States 
ISM surveys  CPI – y/y % change 
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Nonfarm payrolls & jobless claims (‘000)  New orders – y/y % change 
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Forecasts Table 
3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
GDP (1996 US$,y/y) 2.9 3.1 2.9 3.2 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.9
q/q annual rate 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.2 2.5 2.9 3.1
Private consumption 1.7 3.0 2.9 2.4 4.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.5
Fixed investment - nonresid. 5.7 10.8 9.5 10.0 7.7 12.1 10.3 9.6 8.8 9.6 8.6
Fixed investment - residential -3.0 3.9 9.8 -27.3 3.3 10.2 12.7 10.3 8.4 9.4 11.3
Government consumption 1.0 -0.1 -0.5 3.9 -1.7 -1.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.5
Export 11.7 9.1 8.8 6.7 8.6 11.0 10.0 8.0 8.0 8.5 10.0
Import 12.6 8.2 7.6 16.8 -12.6 8.3 9.7 7.9 6.8 6.9 7.7
Stockbuilding (% contr. to GDP) 1.4 0.6 -0.5 0.4 -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1
Current account (% of GDP) -3.2 -3.7 -3.8 -3.5 -3.1 -3.6 -3.7 -3.7 -3.7 -3.7 -3.8
Federal Deficit (% of GDP) -9.9 -9.5 -7.7
Gov. Debt (% of GDP) 93.0 98.3 101.7
CPI (y/y) 1.6 2.9 1.6 1.2 1.3 2.1 3.0 3.3 3.1 2.2 1.5
Industrial production 5.7 5.2 4.1 6.4 3.0 5.8 6.1 4.5 3.5 3.1 3.8
Unemployment (%) 9.6 9.0 8.2 9.6 9.6 9.0 9.2 9.1 8.9 8.6 8.3
2010 2011 2012
2010 2011 2012
 
Note: Percentage annualised growth rates over previous period. if not otherwise specified. 
Source: EcoWin. Intesa Sanpaolo 
 Weekly Economic Monitor 
15 April 2011 
 
Intesa Sanpaolo – Research Department  20 
 
Euro Area 
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Inflation  Inflation forecasts 
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Headline inflation
Core inflation
 % 2010 2011 2012
January 0.9 2.3 2.0
February 0.8 2.4 2.1
March 1.6 2.7 1.8
April 1.6 2.6 2.0
May 1.7 2.6 2.0
June 1.5 2.9 2.0
July 1.7 2.9 1.9
August 1.6 2.9 2.0
September 1.9 2.7 2.2
October 1.9 2.9 1.5
November 1.9 2.8 2.2
December 2.2 2.5 2.2  
Source: Eurostat, Intesa Sanpaolo forecast  Source: Eurostat 
 
Forecasts Table 
3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
GDP (constant prices, y/y) 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.4
- q/q change 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Private consumption 0.7 1.2 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2
Fixed investment -0.8 1.2 1.9 -0.1 -0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Government consumption 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Export 10.6 8.0 5.4 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
Import 8.7 5.9 5.5 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4
Stockbuilding (% contr. to GDP) 0.4 0.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1
Current account (% of GDP) -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.2
Deficit (% of GDP) -6.1 -4.3 -3.5
Debt (% of GDP) 83.6 86.5 86.9
CPI (y/y) 1.6 2.6 1.9 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 1.9 1.8
Industrial production 7.3 5.9 1.8 1.1 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.4
Unemployment (%) 10.0 9.7 8.9 10.0 10.0 9.9 9.8 9.7 9.4 9.2 9.0
3-month Euribor 0.8 1.5 2.2 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2
20122010 2011
2010 2011 2012
 
Note: Percentage annualised growth rates over previous period, if not otherwise specified. 
Source: EcoWin, Intesa Sanpaolo 
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Interest Rates Forecasts 
Sep-10 Dec-10 Mar-11 15/4 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12 Sep-10 Dec-10 Mar-11 15/ 4 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12
Refi rate 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 Fed Funds 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50
1m Euribor 0.63 0.79 0.98 1.17 1.17 1.55 1.85 2.10  3m Libor USD 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.32 0.39 0.48 0.88
3m Euribor 0.89 1.01 1.24 1.33 1.42 1.75 1.95 2.15
Sep-30 Dec-31 Mar-31 15/4 Jun-30 Sep-30 Dec-31 Mar-31 Sep-30 Dec-31 Mar-31 15/ 4 Jun-30 Sep-30 Dec-31 Mar-31
O/N target 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 Base rate 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 1.50
 3m Libor JPY 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.40 0.45 0.45 3m Libor GBP 0.73 0.76 0.82 0.82 0.75 0.80 1.35 1.80
 Source: Intesa Sanpaolo elaborations on Thomsons Reuters data
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